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Quantum key distribution over probabilistic quantum repeaters is addressed. We compare, under practical
assumptions, two such schemes in terms of their secret key generation rates per quantum memory. The two
schemes under investigation are the one proposed by Duan et al. [Nature (London) 414, 413 (2001)] and that
of Sangouard et al. [ Phys. Rev. A 76, 050301 (2007)]. We consider various sources of imperfection in both
protocols, such as nonzero double-photon probabilities at the sources, dark counts in detectors, and inefficiencies
in the channel, photodetectors, and memories. We also consider memory decay and dephasing processes in our
analysis. For the latter system, we determine the maximum value of the double-photon probability beyond which
secret key distillation is not possible. We also find crossover distances for one nesting level to its subsequent one.
We finally compare the two protocols in terms of their achievable secret key generation rates at their optimal
settings. Our results specify regimes of operation where one system outperforms the other.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevA.88.012332 PACS number(s): 03.67.Bg, 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex
I. INTRODUCTION
Despite all practical progress with quantum key distribution
(QKD) [1–4], its implementation over long distances remains
to be a daunting task. In conventional QKD protocols such
as BB84 [5], channel loss and detector noises set an upper
bound on the achievable security distance [6]. In addition, the
path loss results in an exponential decay of the secret key
generation rate with distance. Both of these issues can, in
principle, be overcome if one implements entanglement-based
QKD protocols [7,8] over quantum repeater systems [9–12].
This approach, however, is not without its own challenges.
Quantum repeaters require quantum memory (QM) units that
can interact with light and can store their states for sufficiently
long times. Moreover, highly efficient quantum gates might be
needed to perform two-qubit operations on these QMs [9]. The
latter issue has been alleviated, to some extent, by introducing
a novel technique by Duan, Lukin, Cirac, and Zoller (DLCZ)
[10], in which initial entanglement distribution and swapping,
thereafter, rely on probabilistic linear-optic operations. Since
its introduction, the DLCZ idea has been extended and
a number of new proposals have emerged [13–18]. Such
probabilistic schemes for quantum repeaters particularly find
applications in QKD systems of mid- to long distances, which
makes them worthy of analytical scrutiny. This paper compares
DLCZ with one of its favorite successors [17], which relies on
single-photon sources (termed SPS protocol, hereafter). Using
a general system-level approach, which encompasses many
relevant physical sources of imperfections in both systems,
we provide a realistic account of their performance in terms of
their secret key generation rates per logical memory used. This
measure not only quantifies performance, but it also accounts
for possible costs of implementation.
The SPS protocol attempts to resolve one of the key
drawbacks in the original DLCZ protocol: multiphoton emis-
sions. DLCZ uses atomic ensembles as QMs, which lend
themselves to multiphoton emissions. This leads to obtaining
not fully entangled states, hence resulting in lower key
*m.razavi@leeds.ac.uk
rates when used for QKD. To tackle this issue, in the SPS
protocol, entanglement is distributed by ideally generating
single photons, which will either be stored in QMs or directed
toward a measurement site. Whereas, in principle, the SPS
protocol should not deal with the multiphoton problem, in
practice, it is challenging to build on-demand single-photon
sources that do not produce any multiphoton components. A
fair comparison between the two systems is only possible when
one considers different sources of nonidealities in both cases,
as we pursue in this paper.
The SPS protocol is one of the many proposed schemes
for probabilistic quantum repeaters. In [18] authors provide
a review of all such schemes and compare them in terms of
the average time that it takes to generate entangled states,
of a certain fidelity, between two remote memories. Their
conclusion is that in the limit of highly efficient memories and
detectors, the top three protocols are the SPS protocol and two
others that rely on entangled and two photon sources [14,16].
In more practical regimes, however, the SPS protocol seems
to have the best performance per memory and/or mode used.
In this paper, we therefore focus on the SPS protocol and
investigate, under practical assumptions, whether the above
conclusion remains valid in the context of QKD systems.
Our work is distinct from previous related work in its
focusing on the performance of QKD systems over quantum
repeaters. In [18], authors have adopted the general measure
of fidelity to find the average time of entanglement generation.
Whereas their approach provides us with a general insight into
some aspects of quantum repeater systems, it cannot be directly
applied to the case of QKD. In the latter, the performance is not
only a function of the entanglement generation rate, but also
the quantum bit error rate caused by using nonideal entangled
states. To include both of these issues, here we adopt the secret
key generation rate per memory as the main figure of merit,
by which we can specify the optimal setting of the system and
its performance in different regimes of operation.
Another key feature of our work is to use a normalized figure
of merit to compare the DLCZ and SPS protocols. In practice,
to obtain a sufficiently large key rate in such probabilistic
systems, one must use multiple memories and/or modes in
parallel. In order to account for the cost of the system, in
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our analysis, we provide a normalized key rate per memory
and/or mode. We calculate the dependence of the secret key
generation rate on different system parameters when resolving
or nonresolving detectors are used. In particular, we find the
optimal values for relevant system parameters if loss, double-
photon emissions, and dark counts are considered. Moreover,
we account for the dephasing and the decay of memories in our
analysis. Memory decoherence is one of the key challenges in
any practical setup.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sec. II, we review the
DLCZ and the SPS protocols, their entanglement distribution
and swapping schemes, as well as their QKD measurements. In
Sec. III, we present our methodology for calculating the secret
key generation rate for the SPS protocol, followed by numer-
ical results in Sec. IV. We draw our conclusions in Sec. V.
II. TWO PROBABILISTIC SCHEMES
FOR QUANTUM REPEATERS
In this section we review two probabilistic schemes,
namely, DLCZ and SPS, for quantum repeaters. We describe
the multiple-memory setup for such systems and model
relevant system components.
A. DLCZ entanglement-distribution scheme
The DLCZ scheme works as follows [see Fig. 1(a)].
Ensemble memories A and B, at distance L, are made of
atoms with -level configurations. They are all initially in
their ground states. By coherently pumping these atoms,
some of them may undergo off-resonant Raman transitions
that produce Stokes photons. The resulting photons are sent
toward a 50:50 beam splitter located at distance L/2 between
L R
50:50
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QM QM
pumppump
L
L R
50:50
(b)
QM QM
A B
L
SPS SPS
FIG. 1. (Color online) Schematic diagram for entanglement
distribution between quantum memories (QMs) A and B for (a) the
DLCZ protocol and (b) the SPS protocol. In both cases, we assume
QMs can store multiple excitations. Sources, memories, and detectors
are represented by circles, squares, and half circles, respectively.
Vertical bars denote beam splitters. In both protocols the detection of
a single photon ideally projects the two memories onto an entangled
state.
A and B. If, ideally, only one photon has been produced
in total at the ensembles, one and, at most, only one of
the detectors in Fig. 1(a) clicks. In such a case, the DLCZ
protocol heralds A and B to be ideally in one of the Bell
states |ψ±〉AB = (|10〉AB ± |01〉AB)/
√
2, where |0〉J is the
ensemble ground state and |1〉J = S†J |0〉J is the symmetric
collective excited state of ensemble J = A,B, where S†J is
the corresponding creation operator [10]. An important feature
of such collective excitations is that they can be read out by
converting their states into photonic states.
The fundamental source of error in the DLCZ scheme is the
multiple-excitation effect, where more than one Stokes photon
are produced [11]. If the probability of generating one Stokes
photon is denoted by pc, there is a probability p2c that each
ensemble emits one photon. If this happens, a click on one of
the two detectors heralds entanglement generation, whereas
the memories are in the separable state |11〉AB .
In practice, one has to find the right balance between
the heralding probability, which increases with pc, and the
quantum bit error rate (QBER), which also increases with pc.
In [11], authors find the optimal value of pc that maximizes
the secret key generation rate in various scenarios when
photon-number resolving detectors (PNRDs) or nonresolving
photon detectors (NRPDs) are used. In this paper, we use their
results in our comparative study.
B. SPS entanglement-distribution scheme
The SPS protocol, proposed in [17] aims at reducing
multiphoton errors and, in particular, terms of the form
|11〉AB by using single-photon sources. The architecture of
this scheme is presented in Fig. 1(b). The two remote parties
each have one single-photon source and one memory. In the
ideal scenario, each source produces exactly one photon on
demand, and these photons are sent through identical beam
splitters with transmission coefficients η. It can be shown that
the state shared by the QMs after a single click on one of the
detectors in Fig. 1(b) is given by [17]
η|00〉AB〈00| + (1 − η)|ψ±〉AB〈ψ±|, (1)
which has our desired entangled state plus a vacuum compo-
nent. The latter, at the price of reducing the rate, can be selected
out once the above state is measured at later stages [10,11].
In a practical setup, several sources of imperfection must
be considered in Fig. 1(b). First, most known techniques
for generating single photons suffer from multiple-photon
emissions. That includes single-photon sources that rely on
parametric down-conversion [19,20], quasiatomic structures
such as quantum dots [21], or the partial memory-readout
technique described in [18]. In all cases, there is a nonzero
probability to generate more than one photon, which manifests
itself in producing nonzero values for second-order coherence
functions [19,20]. For practical purposes, however, it is often
sufficient to consider the effect of two-photon states, as we do
in this paper. It turns out that this approximation is particularly
valid for the systems of interest in this paper. One should also
consider nonidealities in QMs. In our analysis, we account
for reading and writing efficiencies of QMs, as well as their
decay and dephasing processes. We assume that QMs can store
multiple excitations.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) (a) Entanglement connection between two
entangled links A-A′ and B ′-B. The memories A′ and B ′ are read out
and the resulting photons are combined on a 50:50 beam splitter. A
click on one of the detectors projects A and B into an entangled state.
The retrieval efficiencies and quantum efficiencies are represented
by fictitious beam splitters with transmission coefficient ηc and
ηD, respectively. (b) The equivalent butterfly transformation to the
measurement module, where ηs = ηcηD .
Throughout the paper, we assume that both setups in
Fig. 1 are symmetric and phase stabilized. Furthermore, all
conditions required for a proper quantum interference at 50:50
beam splitters are assumed to be met. Recent experimental
progress in QKD shows that it is indeed possible to achieve
these conditions [22,23].
C. Entanglement swapping and QKD measurements
Figure 2(a) shows the entanglement swapping setup for
the DLCZ and the SPS protocols. Entanglement is established
between QM pairsAA′ andB ′B using either protocol. A partial
Bell-state measurement (BSM) on photons retrieved from the
middle QMs A′ and B ′ is then followed, which, upon success,
leaves A and B entangled. The BSM is effectively performed
by a 50:50 beam splitter and single-photon detectors. To
include the effects of the atomic-to-photonic conversion
efficiency and the photodetectors’ quantum efficiency, we
introduce two fictitious beam splitters with transmission
coefficients ηc and ηD, respectively. All photodetctors in
Fig. 2 will then have unity quantum efficiencies. Note that
the parameter ηc also includes the memory decay during the
storage time.
Figure 2(b) provides a simplified model for the measure-
ment module in Fig. 2(a). The 50:50 beam splitter and the two
fictitious beam splitters in Fig. 2(b) constitute what we call
a butterfly operation, which is further studied in Sec. III and
Appendix A.
Alice and Bob use two butterfly operations to generate a
raw key bit, as shown in Fig. 3. After generating entangled
pairs over a distance L, Alice and Bob retrieve the states of
memories and perform a QKD measurement on the resulting
photons. They apply a random relative phase shift, ϕ, of either
0 or π/2 between their two fields. They later, at the sifting
stage, keep only data points where the same phase value is used
by both parties. They then turn their sifted keys into a secret
key by using privacy amplification and error reconciliation
techniques. Eavesdroppers can be detected by following the
BBM92 or the Ekert protocol [7,24].
As mentioned in Sec. I, previous analyses only provide
the fidelity or the time required for a successful creation of
an entangled state [17]. Instead, in Sec. III, we calculate the
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FIG. 3. (Color online) QKD measurements on two entangled
pairs. Two pairs of memories,A-B andC-D, each share an entangled
state. Memories are read out and the resulting photons are combined
at a beam splitter and then detected. Different QKD measurements
can be performed by choosing different phase shift values, ϕ, of 0
and π/2.
secret key generation rate for the SPS scheme and compare it
with that of the DLCZ protocol reported in [11].
It is worth noting that because of the reliance of our
QKD protocols on entanglement, all entanglement swapping
operations at the middle nodes can be done by untrusted
parties, e.g., service providers. This is, in essence, similar
to the recently proposed measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) protocols [25–27], which also rely on
entanglement swapping. MDI-QKD schemes, in their original
form, are not suitable for long-distance quantum cryptography.
By combining them with quantum repeaters in a hybrid setup
that relies on MDI-QKD for the access network and on
quantum repeaters for the core network, one can achieve the
best of the two worlds. Preliminary analysis on such hybrid
networks has been done [28] and the extended work is in
preparation.
D. Multiple-memory configuration
In order to compare different quantum repeater setups, we
consider the multiple-memory configuration shown in Fig. 4(a)
along with the cyclic protocol described in [29,30]. In this
protocol, in every cycle of duration L0/c, where L0 is the
length of the shortest segment in a quantum repeater and c
(a)
>
1
Q
M
s
N
BSM
0
2 LL
n
(b)
Mmodes
>
FIG. 4. (Color online) (a) A quantum repeater with multiple
quantum memories per node. At each round, we employ entanglement
distribution protocol to entangle any unentangled memory pairs over
shortest links. At any such cycle, we also match up entangled pairs
at different stations to perform Bell-state measurements (BSMs).
(b) A quantum repeater with multimode memories. In each round,
we apply our entanglement distribution scheme on all M modes, until
one of them becomes entangled. BSM will be followed as soon as
entanglement is established on both sides.
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is the speed of light in the channel, we try to entangle any
unentangled pairs of memories at distance L0. We assume our
entanglement-distribution protocol succeeds with probability
PS(L0). At each cycle, we also perform as many BSMs as
possible at the intermediate nodes. The main requirement for
such a protocol is that, at the stations that we perform BSMs,
we must be aware of establishment of entanglement over links
of length l/2 before extending it to l (informed BSMs). We use
the results of [29] to calculate the generation rate of entangled
states per memory in the limit of infinitely many memories. It is
given by Rent(L) = PS(L/2n)P (1)M P (2)M · · ·P (n)M /(2L/c), where
P
(i)
M , i = 1, . . . ,n, is the BSM success probability at nesting
level i for a quantum repeater with n nesting levels.
We use the following procedure, in forthcoming sections,
to find the secret key generation rate of the setup in Fig. 4(a).
For each entanglement distribution scheme, we find PS(L0)
and relevant PM probabilities to derive Rent(L). We then find
the sifted key generation rate by multiplying Rent(L) by the
probability, Pclick, that an acceptable click pattern occurs upon
QKD measurements. Finally, the ratio between the number
of secure bits and the sifted key bits is calculated using the
Shor-Preskill lower bound [31]. In the limit of an infinitely
long key, the secret key generation rate per logical memory is
lower bounded by
RQKD(L) = max{Rent(L)Pclick[1 − 2H (ǫQ)],0}, (2)
where ǫQ denotes the QBER, andH (p)=−p log2 p− (1−p)
log2(1 − p), for 0  p  1.
E. Multimode-memory configuration
Another way to speed up the entanglement generation rate
is via using multimode memories [15,32]. As can be seen in
Fig. 4(b), in this setup, we use only one physical memory per
node but each memory is capable of storing multiple modes.
In each round, we attempt to entangle memories at distance
L0 by entangling, at least, one of the existing M modes.
Once this occurs, we stop entanglement generation on that
leg and wait until a BSM can be performed. For readout, all
modes must be retrieved in order to perform BSMs or QKD
measurements on particular modes of interest. In effect, this
scheme is similar to that of Fig. 4(a), except that entanglement
distribution is not sequentially applied to unentangled modes.
The success probability for entanglement distribution between
the two memories is, however, M times that of Fig. 4(a). One
can show that, the generation rate of entangled states per mode
is approximately given by ( 23 )nRent(L) [18,30].
In our forthcoming analysis, we consider only the case of
Fig. 4(a), but our results are extensible to the case of Fig. 4(b)
by accounting for the relevant prefactor.
F. Memory decay and dephasing
Quantum memories are expected to decay and dephase
while storing quantum states. In this paper, we model these
two decoherence processes independently. The decay process,
with a time constant T1, can be absorbed in the retrieval
efficiency of memories. If the retrieval efficiency immediately
after writing into the memory is given byη0, after a storage time
T , the retrieval efficiency is given by ηc = η0 exp(−T/T1).
Different memories in the multiple-memory setup of Fig. 4(a)
undergo different decay times. In our analysis, we consider
the worst-case scenario, where all memories have decayed for
T = L/c, which is applicable only to the far-end memories.
Under this assumption, ηc can be treated as a constant at all
stages of entanglement swapping.
We model the memory dephasing via a dephasing channel,
by which the probability of dephasing after a period T is
given by ed = [1 − exp(−T/T2)]/2. In the context of the
QKD protocol in Fig. 3, this phase error is equivalent to
the misalignment error in a conventional polarization-based
BB84 protocol and has mostly the same effect. In our analysis,
we neglect the effect of dephasing at the middle stages and
consider only its effect on the far-end memories used for
the QKD protocol. Again, for the multiple-memory setup of
Fig. 4(a), the relevant storage time is given by T = L/c [29].
III. SPS SECRET KEY GENERATION RATE
In this section, the secret key generation rate for the SPS
scheme proposed in [17] is calculated. As shown in Sec. II, this
scheme relies on simultaneous generation of single photons in
two remote sites. Most practical schemes for the generation
of single photons, however, suffer from the possibility of
multiple-photon emissions. To address this issue, in this
section we consider nonideal photon sources with nonzero
probabilities for two-photon emissions and find the secret key
generation rate in the repeater and no-repeater cases.
Suppose our photon sources emit one photon with proba-
bility 1 − p and two photons with probability p. We therefore
have the following input density matrix for the initial state of
l and r sources in Fig. 5(a):
ρ
(in)
lr = ρ(in)l ⊗ ρ(in)r , (3)
where
ρ
(in)
j ≡ (1 − p)|1〉jj 〈1| + p|2〉jj 〈2|, j = l, r. (4)
As we show later, in a practical regime of operation,
p ≪ 1; hence, in our following analysis, we neglect O(p2)
terms corresponding to the simultaneous emission of two
photons by both sources.
A. No-repeater case
In this section, we describe how we obtain parameters
PS, Pclick, and RQKD for the setup in Fig. 5(a) and QKD
measurements as in Fig. 3.
Figure 5(a) depicts the entanglement-distribution setup
for the SPS scheme. In our model the memories’ writing
efficiencies, the path loss, and the detectors’ efficiencies
are represented by fictitious beam splitters with transmis-
sion coefficients ηm, ηt , and ηD, respectively, where ηt =
exp[−L/(2Latt)], with Latt = 25 km for an optical fiber
channel. Photodetectors, in Fig. 5, are then assumed to have
unity quantum efficiencies.
In our analysis, we use an equivalent setup, as shown in
Fig. 5(b), where beam splitters have been rearranged such that
ηtηD = ηmηd . We can then recognize similar building blocks,
which we referred to as butterfly modules, in Fig. 5(b). A
butterfly module, as shown in Fig. 6, is a two-input, two-output
012332-4
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FIG. 5. (Color online) A schematic model for the SPS scheme.
In (a) the memories’ writing efficiencies, the path loss, and the
detectors’ efficiencies are represented by fictitious beam splitters
with transmission coefficients ηm, ηt and ηD , respectively. In (b),
an equivalent model is represented, where we have grouped beam
splitters in the form of butterfly modules; see Fig. 6. Here, ηtηD =
ηmηd and the model is valid so long as ηtηd  ηm.
building block consisting of three beam splitters. For an input
state ρL′R′ in Fig. 6, we denote the output state on ports L and
R as BηB ,ηx (ρL′R′).
We use well-known models for beam splitters [33] to find
output density matrices for input states to a generic butterfly
module. In Appendix A, we find the relevant input-output
relationships for the states of interest. We use MAPLE 15 to
simplify some of our analytical results. We can then find
ρALBR, the joint state of the memories and the optical modes
entering detectorsL andR in Fig. 5(b) by applying the butterfly
operation three times, as follows:
ρALBR = B0.5,ηd
(
Bη,ηm
(
ρ
(in)
l
)⊗ Bη,ηm(ρ(in)r )). (5)
According to the SPS protocol, a click on exactly one of
the detectors L or R in Fig. 5(b) would herald the success
of entanglement distribution. This process can be modeled by
applying proper measurement operators considering whether
PNRDs or NRPDs are used. For example, for a click on
detector L, the explicit form of the measurement operator is
given by
M =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1 − dc)[|1〉LL〈1| ⊗ |0〉RR〈0|
+ dc|0〉LL〈0| ⊗ |0〉RR〈0|], PNRD
(1 − dc)[(IL − |0〉LL〈0|) ⊗ |0〉RR〈0|
+ dc|0〉LL〈0| ⊗ |0〉RR〈0|], NRPD
(6)
RL
x
L’ R’
x
B
FIG. 6. (Color online) A generic butterfly module, represented by
BηB ,ηx , where ηB and ηx are transmissivities for beam splitters shown
in the figure.
where IL denotes the identity operator for the mode entering
the left detector [34], and dc is the dark count rate per gate
width per detector.
After the measurement, the resulting joint state, ρAB , of
quantum memories is given by
ρAB =
trL,R(ρALBRM)
P
, (7)
where
P = tr(ρALBRM) = PS(L)2 (8)
is the probability that the conditioning event M occurs. The
last equality is due to the symmetry assumption.
For QKD measurements, we assume that two pairs of
memories, A-B and C-D, are given in an initial state
similar to that of Eq. (7). We use the scheme described in
Fig. 3 to perform QKD measurements. For simplicity, we
assume both users use zero phase shifts; other cases can
be similarly worked out in our symmetric setup. In Fig. 3,
the retrieval efficiency and the quantum detectors efficiency
are represented by fictitious beam splitters with, respectively,
transmission coefficient ηc and ηD. It is again possible to
remodel the setup in Fig. 3 as shown in Fig. 2(b) and use
the butterfly operation B0.5,ηs , where ηs = ηcηD. The density
matrix right before photodetection in Fig. 3 is then given by
B0.5,ηs (B0.5,ηs (ρAB ⊗ ρCD)), where one of the B operators is
applied to modes A and C, and the other one to modes B
and D. Using this state, we find Pclick and ǫQ as outlined in
Appendix B.
Using Eq. (2), the secret key generation rate per memory,
RQKD, in the no-repeater setup, is then lower bounded by [11]
R1 = max
[
[1 − 2H (ǫQ)] PS(L)2L/c Pclick/2, 0
]
, (9)
where PS (L)2L/c , given by Eq. (8), is the generation rate of
entangled pairs per logical memory, Pclick is the probability
of creating a sifted key bit by using two entangled pairs, and
[1 − 2H (ǫQ)] is the probability of creating a secret key bit out
of each sifted key bit. Here, we assume a biased basis choice
to avoid an extra factor of two reduction in the rate [35]. The
full definition for Pclick is given by Eq. (B3). The QBER,
ǫQ =
Perror
Pclick
, (10)
where Perror is the probability that Alice and Bob assign
different bits to their sifted keys, is given by Eq. (B4).
B. Repeater case
First, consider the repeater setup of nesting level one in
Fig. 2(a). We use the structure of Fig. 5(a) to distribute
entanglement between A-A′ and B ′-B memories. The initial
joint state of the system, ρAA′BB ′ = ρAA′ ⊗ ρBB ′ , can then be
found, using Eq. (7), as described in the previous section.
We then apply a BSM by reading memories A′ and B ′
and interfering the resulting optical modes at a 50:50 beam
splitter. Success is declared if exactly one of the detectors in
Fig. 2(a) clicks. This can be modeled by applying measurement
012332-5
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operators in Eq. (6), which results in
ρAB =
trLR(Mρ ′ALBR)
PL
, (11)
where ρ ′ALBR = B0.5,ηs (ρAA′BB ′ ), where L and R represent the
input modes to the photodetectors. Note that in Fig. 2 the
detectors have ideal unity quantum efficiencies. Moreover,
PL = tr(Mρ ′ALBR) = PM/2 (12)
is the probability that only the left detector clicks in the BSM
module of Fig. 2. A click on the right detector has the same
probability by symmetry.
In order to find the secret key generation rate, we follow
similar steps to the no-repeater case. That is, we apply the
butterfly operation to find relevant density matrices, from
which Pclick and ǫQ can be obtained. From Eq. (2), in the
one-node repeater case, RQKD is lower bounded by
R2 = max
[
[1 − 2H (ǫQ)] PS
(L/2)
2L/c
PM Pclick/2, 0
]
. (13)
Using the same approach, and by using Eq. (2), we find the
secret key generation rate for higher nesting levels. The details
of which have, however, been omitted for the sake of brevity.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results for the secret
key generation rate of the SPS protocol, versus different
system parameters, in the no-repeater and repeater cases,
and we compare them with that of the DLCZ protocol. As
mentioned earlier, we have used MAPLE 15 to analytically
derive expressions for Eqs. (2), (9), and (13) when PNRDs or
NRPDs are used. Unless otherwise noted, we use the nominal
values summarized in Table I for all the results presented in
this section.
A. SPS key rate versus system parameters
1. Source transmission coefficient
Figure 7 shows the secret key generation rate per memory,
RQKD, versus the source transmission coefficient η in Fig. 1(b),
TABLE I. Nominal values used in our numerical results.
Memory writing efficiency, ηm 0.5
Quantum efficiency, ηD 0.3
Memory retrieval efficiency, ηc 0.7
Dark count per pulse, dc 10−6
Attenuation length, Latt 25 km
Speed of light, c 2 × 105 km/s
Decay (dephasing) time constants, T1 (T2) ∞
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FIG. 7. (Color online) RQKD versus the source transmission
coefficient η for the PNRDs and NRPDs in the no-repeater and
one-node repeater cases. Here, p = 0.001, L = 250 km, and n = 1
for the repeater system; other parameters are listed in Table I
at p = 0.001 and L = 250 km. It can be seen that there exist
optimal values of η for both repeater and no-repeater systems.
Table II summarizes these optimum values for different nesting
levels. The optimal value of η for the no-repeater system
is higher than the repeater ones, and that is because of the
additional entanglement swapping steps in the latter systems.
Another remarkable feature in Fig. 7 is that the penalty of
using NRPDs, versus PNRDs, seems to be minor at p = 10−3.
PNRDs better show their advantage at higher values of p when
double-photon terms become more evident.
The existence of an optimal value for η arises from a com-
petition between the probability of entanglement distribution
PS , which grows with η, and Pclick, which decreases with η.
This has been demonstrated in the inset of Fig. 7. The latter
issue is mainly because of the vacuum component in Eq. (1).
In the case of the repeater system, PM also decreases with η
for the same reason, and that is why the optimal value of η is
lower for repeater systems.
The optimum values of η in Fig. 7 are interestingly almost
identical to the value of η that minimizes the total time for a
successful creation of an entangled state, as prescribed in [17].
It is because, at a fixed distance, the QBER term in Eqs. (9)
and (13) is mainly a function of the double-photon probability
and the dark count rate, and it does not vary considerably with
η. More generally, the optimum values of η remain constant as
in Table II so long as the error terms are well below the cutoff
threshold in QKD.
TABLE II. Optimal values of η, at p = 0.001 and L = 250 km,
for repeater and no-repeater systems, when PNRDs or NRPDs are
used. The figures with an asterisk are approximate values.
Nesting level PNRD NRPD
0 0.35 0.34
1 0.28 0.27
2 0.21 0.20*
3 0.12 0.11*
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FIG. 8. (Color online) RQKD versus distance for up to three
nesting levels at two different dark count rates at p = 10−4. All other
values are listed in Tables I and II.
2. Nesting levels and crossover distance
Figure 8 depicts the normalized secret key generation rate
versus distance for different nesting levels. At dc = 0, the
slope advantage, proportional to PS(L/2n), for higher nesting
levels is clear in the figure. Because of additional entanglement
swapping stages, the no-path-loss rate at L = 0 is, however,
lower for higher nesting levels. That would result in crossover
distances—at which one system outperforms another—once
we move from one nesting level to its subsequent one.
The crossover distance has architectural importance and will
specify the optimum distance between repeater nodes.
The crossover distance is a function of various system
parameters. As shown in the inset of Fig. 8, positive dark
count rates can change considerably the crossover distance.
By including dark counts in our analysis, there will be a
cutoff security distance for each nesting level. By increasing
the dark count rate, these cutoff distances will decrease and
become closer to each other. That would effectively reduce the
crossover distance. At dark count rates as high as dc = 10−6,
the superiority of three over two nesting levels at long distances
would almost diminish as they both have almost the same
cutoff distances.
The crossover distance will decrease if component efficien-
cies go up. This has been shown in Fig. 9 when the crossover
distance is depicted versus measurement efficiency. The latter
directly impacts the BSM success probability, PM , and that is
why the larger its value the lower is the crossover distance.
Larger values of ηm also reduce the vacuum component, thus
enhancing the chance of success at the entanglement swapping
stage.
It can be noted in Fig. 9 that, even for highly efficient
devices, the optimum distance between repeater nodes
would tend to lie at around 150–200 km. For instance, at
L = 1000 km, and with the nominal values used in this paper,
the optimum nesting level is 2, which implies that the distance
between two nodes of the repeater is 250 km. This could
be a long distance for practical purposes, such as for phase
stabilization, and that might require us to work at a suboptimal
distancing. The latter would further reduce the secret key
generation rate. Our result is somehow different from what
1400
1000
1200 2 3 nesting level
600
800 1 2 nesting level
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1200
400 0 1 nesting level
Measurement efficiency,
s
FIG. 9. (Color online) The crossover distance, at which a repeater
system with nesting level n outperforms a system with nesting level
n− 1, as a function of measurement efficiency ηs = ηcηD , at p =
10−4. All other parameters are taken from Tables I and II, except for
the dark count, which is 10−7.
is reported in [18,30], although one should bear in mind the
different set of assumptions and measures used therein.
3. Double-photon probability
Figures 10 show the secret key generation rate for the
SPS protocol, at the optimal values of η listed in Table II,
versus the double-photon probability p in the no-repeater
and repeater cases. It can be seen that, in both cases, there
exists a cutoff probability at which RQKD becomes zero.
This point corresponds to the threshold QBER of 11% from
the Shor-Preskill security proof. In the case of QMs with
sufficiently long coherence times, as is the case in Fig. 10,
the QBER in our system stems from two factors: dark count
and double-photon probability. The former is proportional
to dc/ηd and it comes into effect only when the path loss
is significant. The latter, however, affects the QBER at all
distances. To better see this issue, in Fig. 10(b) the cutoff
probability is depicted versus the dark count rate. It can be
seen that the cutoff probability linearly goes down with dc,
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Double photon probability, p
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FIG. 10. (Color online) (a) RQKD versus double-photon proba-
bility, p, using PNRDs and NRPDs in the no-repeater and one-node
repeater cases. (b) Cutoff double-photon probability, at which the key
rate becomes zero, versus the dark count rate dc. The higher the dark
count rate, the less room for multiphoton errors. All graphs are at
L = 250 km.
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TABLE III. Cutoff double-photon probabilities when PNRDs are
used for different nesting levels. The paramter values used are listed
in Tables I and II.
Nesting level Cutoff double-photon probability
0 2.5 × 10−2
1 5.0 × 10−3
2 1.8 × 10−3
3 2.1 × 10−4
which confirms the additive contribution of dark counts and
two-photon emissions to the QBER.
The cutoff probability at dc = 0 deserves particular atten-
tion. As can be seen in Fig. 10(b), for the no-repeater system,
the maximum allowed value ofp is about 0.028 for PNRDs and
0.026 for NRPDs. This implies that the QBER in this case, at
dc = 0, is roughly given by 4p. This can be verified by finding
the contributions from two- and single-photon components in
Eq. (4). We can then show that the QBER, at the optimal
value of η in Table II, is roughly given by 3(1 + η)p ≈ 4p.
Similarly, in the repeater case, one can show that each BSM
almost doubles the contribution of two-photon emissions to
the QBER. Considering that four pairs of entangled states
is now needed, and that the chance of making an error for
an unentangled pair is typically 1/2, the QBER is roughly
given by 4 × 2 × 3(1 + η)p/2 ≈ 16p, which implies that, to
the first-order approximation, the maximum allowed value for
p is about 0.11/16 = 0.0068. Figure 10(a) confirms this result,
where the cutoff probability is about 0.0056 for the PNRDs
and 0.0054 for the NRPDs, corresponding to ǫQ ≈ 20p.
With a similar argument as above, one may roughly expect
a factor of 4 to 5 increase in the QBER for each additional
nesting level. This implies that for a repeater system with
nesting level 3, we should expect a QBER around 500p just
because of the double-photon emission. Table III confirms
our approximation by providing the actual cutoff figures for
different nesting levels. We discuss the practical implications
of this finding later in this section.
4. Memory dephasing
Figure 11(a) shows the secret key generation rate per
memory for the SPS protocol with NRPDs versus distance for
two different values of the dephasing time, T2, at p = 10−3.
It is clear that, by reducing the coherence time, the security
distance drops to shorter distances. Whereas at T2 = 100 ms
the key rate remains the same as that of Fig. 8(b), at T2 = 10 ms
both repeater and nonrepeater systems would fall short of
supporting distances over 360 km.
Figure 11(b) shows the secret key generation rate per
memory versus T2 at L = 250 km. There is a minimum
required coherence time of around 5 ms below which we
cannot exchange a secret key. This point corresponds to the
11% QBER mainly caused by the dephasing process. In fact,
at this point, we have ǫQ ≈ ed = {1 − exp[−L/(cT2)]}/2 =
0.11, which implies that the maximum distance supported
by our protocol is about cT2/4. To be operating on the flat
region in the curves shown in Fig. 11(b), one even requires a
higher coherence time. In other words, the minimum required
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FIG. 11. (Color online) (a) The secret key generation rate versus
distance for two values of decoherence time, T2 = 10 and 100 ms. In
(b) the secret key rate is plotted as a function of T2 at L = 250 km.
In both graphs, p = 10−3.
coherence time to support a link of length L is on the order
of 10L/c. This is in line with findings in [29]. Although not
explicitly shown here, the same requirements are expected to
be as applicable to other QKD systems that rely on quantum
repeaters.
B. SPS versus DLCZ
Figure 12 compares the secret key generation rate for the
SPS protocol found in this paper with that of the DLCZ
protocol as obtained in [11]. In both systems, we have assumed
dc = 0. All other parameters are as in Table I. In both systems,
we use the optimal setting in the PNRD case. The conclusion
would be similar if one uses NRPDs, as seen in all numerical
results presented in this paper. For the SPS protocol, the
optimal setting corresponds to the values of η in Table II. In
the DLCZ protocol, the adjustable parameter is the excitation
probability pc. Note that, whereas in the SPS protocol, the
rate decreases monotonically with p, in the DLCZ protocol,
it peaks at a certain value of pc. That is because in the SPS
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FIG. 12. (Color online) Comparison between the DLCZ and SPS
protocols using PNRDs. For both systems, the better of repeater or
non-repeater system is used. Both systems operate at their optimal
setting: For the SPS protocol, the optimum value of η is used; for
the DLCZ protocol, the optimum value of pc is used. By varying the
double-photon probability, p, in the SPS protocol, we find that the
maximum p at which SPS outperforms DLCZ is around p = 0.004.
In all curves, dc = 0. All other parameters are taken from Tables I
and II.
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protocol we use an on-demand source of photons, whereas in
the DLCZ protocol the heralding probability as well as the
relative double-photon probability are both proportional to pc.
The optimum value for the excitation probability is given by
pc = 0.0243 in the no-repeater case and pc = 0.0060 in the
one-node repeater case [11]. Note that the analysis in [11]
accounts for all multiexcitation components in the initial state
of the system. In all curves in Fig. 12, we have used the better
of the repeater and no-repeater systems at each distance. Our
results show that the SPS protocol offers a higher key rate per
memory than the DLCZ for on-demand single-photon sources
with double-photon probabilities of 0.004 or lower. The advan-
tage is, however, below one order of magnitude in most cases.
A key assumption in the results obtained above is the use
of on-demand sources in the SPS protocol. The less-than-one-
order-of-magnitude difference between the two protocols can
then be easily washed away if one uses single-photon sources
with less than roughly 50% efficiencies. This means that the
conventional methods for generating single photons, such as
parametric down-conversion or quantum dots, may not yet
be useful in the SPS protocol. The partial memory-readout
technique could still be a viable solution. In this scheme, we
drive a Raman transition, as in the DLCZ protocol, in an atomic
ensemble, such that with some probability p a Stokes photon
is released. If we detect such a photon, then we are left with
an ensemble, which can be partially read out with probability
η to resemble the first part of the SPS protocol. One should,
however, note that with limitations on the cutoff probability
to be on the order of 10−4–10−5, it may take quite a long
time to prepare such a source-memory pair. For instance, if
the required p is 10−4, and the efficiency of the collection and
detection setup is 0.1, even if we run the driving pulse at a
1-GHz rate, it takes on average 0.1 ms to prepare the initial
state. This time is comparable to the time that it takes for light
to travel 100 km, which is on the same order of magnitude
that we run our cyclic protocol in Fig. 4(a). Considering a
particular setup parameters, it is not then an obvious call to
which of the DLCZ or SPS protocols performs better, and that
underlines the importance of our theoretical analysis.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed the SPS protocol proposed
in [17] in terms of the secret key generation rate that it could
offer in a QKD-over-repeater setup. This protocol belongs
to a family of probabilistic quantum repeaters, perhaps one
of their best, inspired by the DLCZ proposal [10]. Our aim
was to compare the SPS protocol for QKD applications
with the original DLCZ protocol, as reported in [11], in a
realistic scenario. To this end, we considered various sources of
imperfections in our analysis and obtained the optimal regime
of operation as a function of system parameters. We accounted
for double-photon probabilities at the source and realized that,
under Shor-Preskill’s security-proof assumptions, its value
should not exceed 0.11/4 in a direct-link scenario and 0.11/20
in a one-node repeater case. We would expect the same scaling,
if not worse, at higher nesting levels, which implied that for a
repeater setup of nesting level 3, the double-photon probability
must be on the order of 10−4 or lower. That would be a
challenging requirement for on-demand single-photon sources
needed in the SPS protocol. Under above circumstances, the
advantage of the SPS protocol over the DLCZ would be
marginal and would not exceed one order of magnitude of key
rate in bit/s per memory. In our analysis, we also accounted
for memory dephasing and dark counts. The former would
quantify one of the key characteristics of quantum memories in
order to be useful in long-distance quantum communications.
Our results showed that the minimum required coherence time
for a link of length L is roughly given by 4L/c, where c is
the speed of light in the channel. The crossover distance at
which we have to move up the nesting-level ladder varies for
different system parameters. The optimum distancing between
repeater nodes can nevertheless be typically as high as 150
to 200 km depending on the measurement efficiency among
other parameters. We noticed that, within practical regimes of
operation, there would only be a minor advantage in using
resolving photodetectors over more conventional threshold
detectors. We emphasized that, because of using a normalized
figure of merit in our analysis, our results would be applicable
to multimemory and/or multimode scenarios.
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APPENDIX A: BUTTERFLY TRANSFORMATION
In this Appendix, we find input-output relationships for the
butterfly module in Fig. 6. We do this in the number-state
representation only for the relevant input states in Eq. (5).
Table IV provides the output state for the butterfly operation
Bη,ηm when there is exactly one or two photons at one of the
input ports. These are the only relevant terms in the input states
in Eqs. (3) and (4). Using Table IV, we find Bη,ηm (ρ(in)l ) ⊗
Bη,ηm (ρ(in)r ), to be used in Eq. (5).
The last operation required in Eq. (5) is the symmetric
butterfly operation B0.5,ηd . Table V lists the input-output
relationships for all relevant input terms in our system for the
more general operationB0.5,ηx . Note that by choosing ηx = ηs ,
we can use the same relationships for the measurement
modules used in entanglement swapping and QKD of Figs. 2
and 3, respectively. For the sake of brevity, in Table V, we have
only included the terms that provide us with nonzero values
after applying the measurement operation. More specifically,
we have removed all asymmetric density matrix terms, such as
|10 〉〈01| or |01 〉〈10| , for which the bra state is different from
the ket state, from the output state.
APPENDIX B: DERIVATION OF Pclick AND Perror
In this Appendix, we find the gain and the QBER for the
QKD scheme of Fig. 3. Let us assume that the memory pairs
AB and CD are already entangled via the no-repeater or the
one-node repeater scheme described in Sec. III. In the case of
SPS protocol, their state is, respectively, given by Eqs. (7) and
(11). The density matrix right before photodetection in Fig. 3
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TABLE IV. The input-output relationship for the Bη,ηm operator. |jk〉〈jk| = |j〉JJ 〈j | ⊗ |k〉KK〈k|, where J = L′ and K = R′ for input
number states and J = L and K = R for output number states in Fig. 6.
ρin Bη,ηm (ρin)
|10〉〈10| ηηm|01〉〈01| + ηm
√
η(1 − η)(|10〉〈01| + |01〉〈10|) + ηm(1 − η)|10〉〈10| + (1 − ηm)|00〉〈00|
(1 − ηm)2|00〉〈00| + 2ηηm(1 − ηm)|01〉〈01| + ηη2m(1 − η)(|20〉〈02| + |02〉〈20|)
|20〉〈20| + 2ηm(1 − ηm)
√
η(1 − η)(|10〉〈01| + |01〉〈10|) + η2η2m|02〉〈02| + 2ηη2m(1 − η)|11〉〈11|
+ η2m(1 − η)
√
2η(1 − η)(|20〉〈11| + |11〉〈20|) + ηη2m
√
2η(1 − η)(|02〉〈11| + |11〉〈02|)
+ 2ηm(1 − η)(1 − ηm)|10〉〈01| + η2m(1 − η)2|20〉〈20|
is then given by ρABCD = B0.5,ηs (B0.5,ηs (ρAB ⊗ ρCD)), where
one of the B operators is applied to modes A and C and the
other one to modes B and D. Using Table V, we can calculate
the exact form of ρABCD , as we have done in this paper.
The most general measurement on the modes entering the
photodetectors of Fig. 3, namely, A, B, C, and D, can be
written in terms of the measurement operators
Mabcd = |a 〉AA〈 a| ⊗ |b 〉BB〈 b| ⊗ |c 〉CC〈 c| ⊗ |d 〉DD〈 d|
(B1)
for PNRDs, where a, b, c, d = 0, 1 and |k 〉K represents a
Fock state for the optical mode K = A,B,C,D. In the
case of NRPDs, we only need to replace |1 〉KK 〈1| with
(IK − |0 〉KK 〈0| ), where IK is the identity operator for
mode K.
Similarly, we can define the corresponding probabilities to
the above measurement operators as follows:
Pabcd = T r (ρABCDMabcd ) . (B2)
The explicit forms for Pclick and Perror are then given by
Pclick = PC + PE (B3)
TABLE V. The input-output relationship for a symmetric butterfly module. The notation used is similar to that of Table IV.
ρin B0.5,ηx (ρin)
|10〉〈10| ηx2 (|10〉〈10| + |01〉〈01|) + (1 − ηx)|00〉〈00|
|01〉〈01| ηx2 (|10〉〈10| + |01〉〈01|) + (1 − ηx)|00〉〈00|
|11〉〈11| ηx(1 − ηx)(|10〉〈10| + |01〉〈01|)+ (1 − ηx)2|00〉〈00| + η
2
x
2 (|20〉〈20| + |02〉〈02|)
|20〉〈20| ηx(1 − ηx)(|10〉〈10| + |01〉〈01|)+ (1 − ηx)2|00〉〈00| + η
2
x
2 |11〉〈11| +
η2x
4 (|20〉〈20| + |02〉〈02|)
|02〉〈02| ηx(1 − ηx)(|10〉〈10| + |01〉〈01|)+ (1 − ηx)2|00〉〈00| + η22 |11〉〈11| +
η2x
4 (|20〉〈20| + |02〉〈02|)
|21〉〈21| 32ηx(1 − ηx)2(|10〉〈10| + |01〉〈01|) + (1 − ηx)3|00〉〈00| +
η2x
2 (1 − ηx)|11〉〈11|
+ 54η2x(1 − ηx)(|20〉〈20| + |02〉〈02|)+ 38η3x(|30〉〈30| + |03〉〈03|) + 18η3x(|21〉〈21| + |12〉〈12|)
|21〉〈21| 32ηx(1 − ηx)2(|10〉〈10| + |01〉〈01|) + (1 − ηx)3|00〉〈00| +
η2x
2 (1 − ηx)|11〉〈11|
+ 54η2x(1 − ηx)(|20〉〈20| + |02〉〈02|)+ 38η3x(|30〉〈30| + |03〉〈03|) + 18η3x(|21〉〈21| + |12〉〈12|)
|10〉〈01| 12ηx(|10〉〈10| − |01〉〈01|)
|01〉〈10| 12ηx(|10〉〈10| − |01〉〈01|)
|11〉〈20|
√
2
2 ηx(1 − ηx)(|10〉〈10| − |01〉〈01|) + 12√2η2x(|20〉〈20| − |02〉〈02|)
|11〉〈02|
√
2
2 ηx(1 − ηx)(|10〉〈10| − |01〉〈01|) + 12√2η2x(|20〉〈20| − |02〉〈02|)
|20〉〈11|
√
2
2 ηx(1 − ηx)(|10〉〈10| − |01〉〈01|) + 12√2η2x(|20〉〈20| − |02〉〈02|)
|02〉〈11|
√
2
2 ηx(1 − ηx)(|10〉〈10| − |01〉〈01|) + 12√2η2x(|20〉〈20| − |02〉〈02|)
|21〉〈21| ηx(1 − ηx)2(|10〉〈10| − |01〉〈01|) + η2x(1 − ηx)(|20〉〈20| − |02〉〈02|)
+ 38η3x(|30〉〈30| − |03〉〈03|)+ 18η3x(|12〉〈12| − |21〉〈21|)
|12〉〈12| ηx(1 − ηx)2(|10〉〈10| − |01〉〈01|) + η2x(1 − ηx)(|20〉〈20| − |02〉〈02|)
+ 38η3x(|30〉〈30| − |03〉〈03|)+ 18η3x(|12〉〈12| − |21〉〈21|)
(1 − ηx)4|00〉〈00| + 2ηx(1 − ηx)3(|10〉〈10| + |01〉〈01|) + η2x(1 − ηx)2|11〉〈11|
|22〉〈22| + 32η3x(1 − ηx)(|30〉〈30| + |03〉〈03|)+ 12η3x(1 − ηx)(|21〉〈21| + |12〉〈12|)
5
2η
2
x(1 − ηx)2(|20〉〈20| + |02〉〈02|) + 38η4x(|40〉〈40| + |04〉〈04|) + 14η4x |22〉〈22|
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and
Perror = edPC + (1 − ed )PE, (B4)
where ed is the dephasing (misalignment) error,
PC =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1 − dc)2
[
P1100 + P0011 + dc(P1000 + P0100 + P0010 + P0001) + 2d2cP0000
]
,PNRD(
d2c
2 − dc + 1
)
(P1100 + P0011) + dc(1 − dc2 )(P1001 + P0110)
+ dc2 (2 − dc)(P1000 + P0100 + P0010 + P0001) +
d2c
2 (2 − dc)2P0000
+ 12 (P1110 + P1101 + P0111 + P1011) + dc2 (2 − dc)(P1010 + P0101) + 12P1111,NRPD
(B5)
is the probability that Alice and Bob assign identical bits to their raw keys if there is no misalignment, and
PE =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1 − dc)2
[
P1001 + P0110 + dc(P1000 + P0100 + P0010 + P0001) + 2d2cP0000
]
,PNRD(
d2c
2 − dc + 1
)
(P1001 + P0110) + dc2 (2 − dc)(P1000 + P0100 + P0010 + P0001)
+ d2c2 (2 − dc)2P0000 + 12 (P1110 + P1101 + P0111 + P1011)
+ dc2 (2 − dc)(P1100 + P1010 + P0011 + P0101) + 12P1111,NRPD
(B6)
is the probability that they make an erroneous bit assignment in the absence of misalignment.
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